Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

The Tianjin Declaration, adopted at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s 25th summit in September 2025, passed without the dramatic headlines that often accompany global gatherings. Yet its significance lies precisely in its restraint. In an era marked by loud proclamations and performative diplomacy, the document reflects a quieter recalibration of Eurasian politics, one that privileges continuity over spectacle and gradual alignment over sudden rupture.

Held in the northern Chinese port city of Tianjin, the summit was the largest in the SCO’s history. Leaders from China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia gathered alongside observers and dialogue partners, marking a quarter-century since the organisation’s founding. Chaired by President Xi Jinping, the meeting reaffirmed what the SCO has consistently presented as its guiding philosophy: the so-called “Shanghai Spirit” of mutual trust, respect for sovereignty, equality among states and non-interference.

At first glance, the declaration reads like a familiar catalogue of principles. It reiterates support for a multipolar world order, stresses adherence to the United Nations Charter and renews commitments to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism. Economic cooperation, regional connectivity and sustainable development are highlighted as shared priorities. There are also nods to global challenges, from trade disruptions to technological governance, reflecting the concerns of a region that now accounts for a substantial share of the world’s population and economic output.

What makes the Tianjin Declaration noteworthy, however, is not the novelty of its language but the context in which it was issued. The international system remains deeply polarised, with major powers locked in strategic competition and multilateral institutions under strain. Against this backdrop, the SCO is positioning itself not as a challenger to existing structures but as an alternative forum where non-Western states can coordinate policies without the pressures of ideological conformity.

This aspiration is evident in the declaration’s emphasis on inclusivity and equality. Unlike alliances built around security guarantees or shared political values, the SCO continues to define itself as a platform for dialogue among diverse political systems. The presence of rivals such as India and Pakistan, alongside countries with varying relations with the West, underscores this point. The organisation’s strength lies in its ability to accommodate difference, even if that very diversity limits its capacity for swift collective action.

One of the more substantive outcomes linked to the Tianjin summit was the approval of the SCO Development Strategy through 2035. This long-term framework seeks to align economic cooperation with social and environmental considerations, echoing global discussions on development without explicitly adopting Western templates. It also provides the backdrop against which Russia’s proposal for a dedicated SCO Council on Sustainable Development should be understood.

Moscow’s initiative, first floated during its chairmanship activities in 2025, reflects both pragmatic and political calculations. By hosting the inaugural SCO Sustainable Development Forum in Omsk and later proposing a formal council at the Heads of Government meeting in Moscow, Russia signalled its intent to shape the organisation’s economic agenda. The focus on sustainable development, energy security and regional models of growth allows Russia to remain relevant within the SCO despite the economic pressures it faces elsewhere. The proposal has found a receptive audience. SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev described the idea as worthy of serious consideration and subsequent meetings have indicated gradual progress. By early 2026, references to sustainable development as a core SCO priority had become more frequent, including discussions held in Islamabad that linked the agenda to poverty reduction, food and energy security and environmental protection.

Importantly, the Tianjin Declaration itself endorsed closer cooperation on sustainability, particularly in industry and energy. While the document stops short of detailing institutional mechanisms, it provides political cover for initiatives such as Russia’s proposed council. In this sense, Tianjin can be seen as a moment of convergence, where broad principles were translated into a shared direction of travel rather than immediate commitments. For countries like Pakistan, the implications are both promising and cautionary. On the one hand, the SCO’s emphasis on development and connectivity aligns with Islamabad’s longstanding interest in regional trade, energy corridors and investment. Participation in sustainability-focused initiatives could offer access to expertise and financing tailored to regional conditions rather than externally imposed benchmarks.

On the other hand, the SCO’s consensus-driven nature means progress will be incremental. Competing national priorities, economic disparities and unresolved bilateral tensions continue to shape the organisation’s trajectory. The Tianjin Declaration does not resolve these contradictions; it merely manages them.The broader geopolitical message of the summit is equally measured. By reaffirming support for a multipolar world, the SCO signals dissatisfaction with existing power hierarchies without articulating a clear alternative order. This ambiguity is deliberate. It allows member states to express shared frustrations while preserving strategic autonomy. For China, hosting the summit reinforced its role as a convening power in Eurasia. For Russia, it offered a stage to demonstrate diplomatic relevance. For others, it provided reassurance that their voices remain part of a collective conversation.

In this light, the Tianjin Declaration should be read less as a manifesto and more as a barometer. It reflects a region seeking stability through cooperation rather than confrontation, aware of global uncertainties yet unwilling to be drawn into rigid blocs. The SCO’s gradual turn towards sustainable development, exemplified by Russia’s initiative, suggests an effort to anchor security concerns within a broader socio-economic framework. Whether this approach will yield tangible results remains an open question. Much will depend on implementation, resource allocation and the ability of member states to move beyond rhetoric. Yet the very fact that such issues are now central to SCO discussions indicates a maturation of the organisation’s agenda.

As global politics grows more fragmented, the Tianjin summit reminds us that not all recalibrations are dramatic. Some unfold through carefully worded declarations, incremental institutional changes and the steady accumulation of shared priorities. In a turbulent world, that quiet persistence may prove to be the SCO’s most enduring contribution.