Qamar Bashir

Frustration is now visible on all sides of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran. After weeks of bombardment, strategic signaling, and diplomatic theater, the central objectives publicly associated with Washington and Tel Aviv still appear only partially achieved. The Strait of Hormuz remains the decisive choke point, Iranian retaliatory capacity has not been extinguished, and the war has entered its second month with fresh troop deployments rather than a settled outcome. Reuters reported on March 30 that thousands of U.S. Army paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne had arrived in the Middle East, joining Marines and other forces already in theater, while officials acknowledged that these deployments increase capacity for possible incursions into Iranian territory, including operations linked to Kharg Island and Hormuz security.

That is why the current moment is so dangerous. Even if a full-scale invasion still remains unlikely, the line between a “limited mission” and an expanding war is historically thin. The United States may initially contemplate a narrow ground operation: seizure of a strategic island, raids on coastal batteries threatening shipping, or even a special operation linked to Iran’s uranium stockpile. Yet history shows that once a great power commits troops and begins receiving body bags in return, its political logic changes. Retaliation produces counter-retaliation. A war presented as surgical starts demanding prestige, vengeance, and escalation. Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan all demonstrated that limited entry rarely guarantees limited exit.

The strategic motives behind such a move are not difficult to understand. Kharg Island is Iran’s principal oil export hub. The Strait of Hormuz carries a huge share of the world’s seaborne oil trade. Control of both would give Washington leverage over global energy flows while denying Tehran its most potent geoeconomic weapon.

At the same time, Iran’s expanding stockpile of highly enriched uranium remains a central concern. Reuters, citing the IAEA, reported earlier this month that Iran held about 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%, material that in theory could be further enriched for roughly 10 nuclear weapons. That figure alone explains why any U.S. operational planning would include not only maritime control and coercive strikes, but also thoughts of raids tied to nuclear assets.

But Iran is not waiting passively for such a contingency. Its parliament speaker has warned that Tehran sees public talk of negotiations as a cover for secret planning for a land assault, and Iranian leaders have vowed to burn any invading force and punish regional partners. Whether or not every Iranian threat is executable, the central point stands: Iran has prepared for attritional resistance, dispersal, underground storage, missile retaliation, drones, and proxy expansion. That means even a limited U.S. ground assault would not occur in a vacuum. It would likely trigger attacks on American bases, shipping lanes, partner infrastructure, and perhaps multiple secondary fronts beyond Iran itself.

This is why the destruction of civilian infrastructure now being threatened is so morally revealing. If ports, roads, bridges, refineries, and power systems are systematically targeted, the principal victims will not be the bunker-protected leadership or deeply buried military networks. The true burden will fall upon ordinary Iranians who never built shelters, never planned for prolonged blackout, and never volunteered to become the human cushion of a geopolitical struggle. Iranian missiles have already damaged Israel’s Haifa refinery complex and widening regional attacks affecting energy installations and bases. Such escalation shows that the war is moving beyond military targets into the economic bloodstream of entire societies.

The illusion that negotiations will easily stop this spiral is also fading. Pakistan has emerged as the most active intermediary, hosting regional discussions and preparing to facilitate U.S.-Iran talks in the coming days. Yet the diplomatic gap remains profound. Washington has promoted a 15-point framework; Iran has publicly rejected it and insists on sovereignty, security, and an end to attacks. Reuters noted on March 30 that Islamabad is preparing to host these efforts, but there was still no confirmation that any direct, substantive breakthrough had been achieved. In other words, the parties remain boxed inside terms that each side fears would amount to capitulation.

Meanwhile, the battlefield itself is expanding horizontally. Israel has widened pressure in Lebanon, the Houthis are threatening to reopen a Red Sea front, and the Saudi dimension has already become more exposed after Iran-linked strikes wounded U.S. personnel at Prince Sultan Air Base. Once Hormuz and the Red Sea are both destabilized, the consequences no longer belong only to Tehran, Tel Aviv, or Washington. They belong to Europe, Asia, Australia, South America, and every economy dependent on fuel, shipping insurance, manufacturing inputs, and stable freight routes. Reuters reported that the war’s energy shock is already dimming the outlook for many economies, according to the IMF.

In this background, four scenarios emerge. The first, and in my judgment the most likely, is a prolonged air-maritime war without a deep occupation of Iran. In this scenario, Washington and Israel continue heavy strikes while avoiding the political and military cost of trying to march into Iran’s interior. The second is a limited U.S. ground raid or seizure of a strategic site such as Kharg Island or coastal launch areas near Hormuz. The third is a negotiated de-escalation through Pakistani and regional mediation. The fourth, least likely but most catastrophic, is a broader regime-change campaign with sustained U.S. ground presence inside Iran.

My own estimate is this: a prolonged high-intensity war without major occupation carries about a 45% probability; a limited ground incursion about 25%; negotiated de-escalation about 20%; and a broad regime-change invasion about 10%. Those figures are not certainties, only judgments based on current force posture, public rhetoric, and the historical reluctance of Washington to bear the cost of long occupation when air and naval coercion can still be intensified. But the most important warning is that even a 25% chance of limited ground action contains within it the seed of a much wider war. Once U.S. boots hit Iranian soil and resistance produces American casualties, domestic pressure in Washington may drive escalation far beyond the original mission.

If the United States “wins,” it may reopen shipping, damage Iran’s missile and naval capacity, and perhaps enforce a new nuclear arrangement. But such a win would still leave behind an unstable region, a humiliated but not necessarily pacified society, and a new cycle of insurgent or proxy retaliation. If Iran holds the line and turns even limited ground operations into a grinding trap, the defeat would be historic, not merely military but psychological, undermining U.S.-Israeli coercive credibility across the region. If negotiations somehow succeed, the outcome will not be friendship. It will be an ugly compromise designed to stop the bleeding.

That is why the world stands at a catastrophic juncture. The danger is not only that a ground assault may occur. The greater danger is that once it begins, no one may be able to keep it limited. The war planners may speak the language of optionality, precision, and controlled force. History speaks a different language. It says that powerful states often enter wars believing they can calibrate violence, only to discover that resistance, pride, and fear rapidly seize control. Let us hope that this time the diplomats win before the generals do, because once the ground war begins, peace may become far more expensive than anyone now imagines.

Qamar Bashir

Press Secretary to the President (Rtd)

Former Press Minister, Embassy of Pakistan to France

Former Press Attaché to Malaysia

Former MD, SRBC | Macomb, Michigan