Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

The prospect of Donald Trump returning to the presidency evokes mixed reactions across different regions. In Europe, this possibility is often perceived as a significant disruption, with fears of strained alliances and economic instability. Adversaries of the United States, such as China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, view such a development as an opportunity to advance their agendas. However, in much of Asia, the reaction is notably more measured. Countries in this region, ranging from Japan and South Korea in the north to the Indian subcontinent in the south, exhibit less concern regarding Trump’s autocratic tendencies or his disdain for liberal internationalism. For Asian states, the return of Trump signifies not a radical shift but rather an acceleration of preexisting U.S. foreign policy trends. Since the Vietnam era, the United States has consistently demonstrated a tendency to recalibrate its global commitments, favoring strategic pragmatism over expansive international engagements.The Nixon Doctrine, introduced in 1969 during the Vietnam War, encapsulates this philosophy. It underscored the United States’ intent to avoid ground-level entanglements, instead favoring stability through an offshore balancing strategy. This approach involved maintaining a military presence through air and naval bases while delegating primary security responsibilities to regional actors. This doctrine established a framework that continues to shape U.S. policy in Asia. Even during deviations such as the post-9/11 “war on terror” and the subsequent protracted conflict in Afghanistan, Asia recognized the United States as a cautious power, deliberate in its international commitments.In the 21st century, this cautious approach has expanded to other regions. The withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 under President Joe Biden exemplifies this trajectory. Biden’s foreign policy—marked by consultative, albeit transactional, engagement—has largely reinforced the groundwork laid during Trump’s first administration. Initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the AUKUS defense pact have solidified U.S. alliances in Asia. However, Biden’s policy also refrains from offering unconditional security guarantees, aligning closely with Trump’s preference for mutually beneficial arrangements.

For many Asian states, Trump’s “America First” ethos resonates with longstanding U.S. strategies in the region. His transactionalism, while less consultative and more unpredictable than Biden’s, remains within the parameters of an offshore balancing framework. Asian leaders, accustomed to the United States prioritizing its own interests, are prepared to navigate these dynamics. Although Trump’s return may raise concerns regarding specific issues such as tariffs and Taiwan, the region’s experience with his earlier administration provides valuable lessons for adapting to shifts in U.S. foreign policy.Comparatively, the Obama administration’s approach to Asia was characterized by rhetorical commitments that were not always matched by decisive actions. Trump’s emphasis on deterrence and transactional diplomacy aligns with the region’s preference for managing disputes through strength and pragmatism. However, specific challenges, including the Taiwan issue, loom large. Biden’s explicit support for Taiwan has heightened tensions, reinforcing a sense of entitlement in Taipei and complicating regional dynamics. Trump’s potential approach, centered on leveraging trade and security concerns, risks exacerbating these tensions. The implications for Taiwan’s strategic positioning and U.S.-China relations demand careful scrutiny.Economic factors further complicate the landscape. Trump’s proclivity for tariffs could reignite trade tensions, particularly with China, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. China’s economic vulnerabilities, exacerbated by a collapsing real estate sector and mounting local government debt, compound the risks. A protracted economic slowdown in China, fueled by retaliatory measures and overreliance on state-directed investments, could have far-reaching consequences for regional stability.Despite these challenges, mutual nuclear deterrence reduces the likelihood of direct military conflict between the United States and China. Instead, regional states are likely to pursue greater intra-Asian cooperation to mitigate uncertainties. However, the absence of strong regional leadership complicates this endeavor. While Japan’s late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe provided decisive leadership during Trump’s first term, current leaders in key states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea lack comparable influence. The region thus faces a leadership vacuum at a critical juncture.Historically, U.S. foreign policy has oscillated between periods of intervention and retrenchment. Trump’s reluctance to engage in long-term foreign commitments reflects an enduring strand of American strategic thought, one that prioritizes national interests over ideological alliances. This perspective aligns with George Washington’s admonition against entangling alliances and resonates with the Nixon Doctrine’s principles.

For U.S. allies and partners, Trump’s potential second term should be viewed not as an anomaly but as a continuation of America’s strategic recalibration. Emulating Asia’s pragmatic approach, Western states must adapt to a United States that prioritizes selective engagement over expansive commitments. In doing so, they can better align their strategies with the evolving contours of U.S. foreign policy.