Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

Taiwan’s foreign policy framework is fundamentally influenced by its interactions with both China and the United States, leaving it relatively unconcerned about recent developments in South Korea’s nuclear policy. Hypothetically, if China were to make explicit nuclear threats against Taiwan, Taipei might reassess its stance on nuclear armament. However, Beijing, unlike Pyongyang, has strategically refrained from employing such provocative rhetoric. Historically, the intricate and often contentious dynamics between Japan and South Korea have compounded the challenges in Tokyo-Seoul relations. Nonetheless, the nuclearization of North Korea over the past 18 years has not catalyzed Japan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, making it improbable that South Korea’s potential nuclearization would provoke such a shift today. Moreover, Japan’s strong anti-nuclear sentiment, deeply rooted in the trauma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, continues to serve as a significant deterrent against any nuclear ambitions.

The underlying drivers of South Korea’s interest in nuclearization are distinct from the circumstances in Japan and Taiwan. In Seoul, the debate is motivated by the pressing nuclear threat posed by North Korea, a scenario that neither Tokyo nor Taipei currently faces. Another pertinent concern associated with nuclear proliferation is safety. New nuclear states are often scrutinized for their potential mismanagement of nuclear arsenals or the risk of these weapons being diverted to unauthorized entities. While such apprehensions are legitimate, they appear less applicable in South Korea’s context. The nation’s robust democratic institutions, as evidenced by the parliament’s rejection of the president’s unexpected martial law declaration and the subsequent public backlash, underline the strength of its civilian oversight and governance. Furthermore, South Korea’s extensive experience in managing a civilian nuclear power industry for decades instills confidence in its capacity to safely handle nuclear materials and ensure stringent command and control over its arsenal. Critics, particularly among South Korean progressives, argue that nuclearization could exacerbate North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs while undermining prospects for peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, this perspective appears increasingly outdated. For decades, Pyongyang has leveraged Seoul’s nuclear restraint to advance its own arsenal, with minimal connection between North Korea’s nuclear decisions and South Korea’s actions. North Korean leadership has unequivocally indicated its intent to retain its nuclear weapons, irrespective of external factors. Paradoxically, the threat of South Korea’s nuclearization may serve as a catalyst for negotiations with Pyongyang, in contrast to the ineffectiveness of continued restraint.

Despite these arguments, South Korean nuclearization is not devoid of risks. If Seoul were to advance its nuclear program, Pyongyang might resort to preemptive measures, such as missile strikes targeting South Korean nuclear facilities, potentially triggering the very conflict North Korea seeks to avoid. However, South Korea is likely to adopt a strategic approach, ensuring that its nuclear infrastructure is well-defended and dispersed, rendering a successful preemptive strike by North Korea highly improbable. Moreover, the repercussions of such an aggressive action by Pyongyang would be catastrophic, galvanizing global opposition and diminishing any strategic gains North Korea might seek. Beyond North Korea, potential responses from China and Russia merit consideration. Both Beijing and Moscow have historically demonstrated limited commitment to curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In recent years, Russia’s alignment with North Korea has grown stronger, potentially complicating South Korea’s nuclearization trajectory. While Moscow might employ tactics such as cyberattacks or increased support for Pyongyang, its economic leverage over Seoul remains minimal, particularly following South Korea’s sanctions against Russia in response to the Ukraine conflict. Similarly, China, despite its significant economic ties with South Korea, has contributed to the security dilemma by refraining from taking decisive action against North Korea’s nuclear advancements. While Beijing might resort to economic sanctions in response to South Korea’s nuclearization, Seoul’s efforts to diversify its economic partnerships, including a shift towards the United States as a primary trade partner, have mitigated its vulnerability to Chinese pressure. Strategically, South Korean nuclearization offers potential benefits for the United States, despite initial apprehensions. A self-reliant South Korean nuclear deterrent could alleviate the burden on Washington to provide direct nuclear coverage, reducing the risk of the U.S. homeland being drawn into a potential conflict with North Korea or China. Moreover, a nuclear-armed South Korea could serve as a regional deterrent within the U.S. alliance framework, akin to the roles of France and the United Kingdom in Europe. Such an arrangement would enable Seoul to shoulder greater responsibility for its security, aligning with long-standing U.S. demands for its allies to enhance their defense capabilities and reduce dependency on American guarantees. The United States’ insistence on strict adherence to nonproliferation principles often undermines its allies’ strategic autonomy. Historical precedents, such as the U.S. opposition to West Germany’s nuclear aspirations during the Cold War, illustrate the tensions inherent in such policies. Coercive measures, including economic sanctions or exclusion from nuclear material markets, risk alienating allies and undermining the liberal democratic values that the United States seeks to promote. In South Korea’s case, allowing greater strategic autonomy would not only strengthen bilateral ties but also enhance regional stability by addressing the security challenges posed by North Korea’s expanding arsenal.

Intermediate options, such as the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea or a nuclear-sharing arrangement, offer potential compromises. However, these measures are fraught with limitations, including the persistent fear of U.S. abandonment and the challenges of ensuring credible deterrence. A more viable alternative might involve South Korea pursuing a “nuclear latency” strategy, wherein it develops the capability to rapidly produce nuclear weapons without crossing the threshold of actual weaponization. While such a strategy could provide a deterrent effect without violating international norms, it also risks provoking international backlash if perceived as de facto nuclearization.

Ultimately, South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons reflects a broader shift in regional security dynamics and the limitations of existing nonproliferation frameworks in addressing asymmetric threats. By achieving a limited yet survivable nuclear arsenal, Seoul could restore inter-Korean nuclear parity, enhance its strategic independence, and contribute to the broader stability of East Asia. For the United States, accommodating South Korea’s nuclear aspirations, rather than obstructing them, represents a pragmatic approach that balances regional security imperatives with the principles of alliance management and liberal internationalism.