Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

As the U.S. presidential election approaches, the United States confronts several pressing economic, social, and political challenges that will critically shape the outcome of the contest between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Persistent inflation, the widening wealth inequality, and deeply polarized opinions on immigration and border policies have emerged as key domestic concerns influencing the electorate. Beyond these internal matters, however, the election will also carry significant consequences for U.S. foreign policy.The predominant foreign policy issue in this election is the intensifying economic rivalry with China, coupled with the escalating tensions in the South China Sea, a vital maritime route through which approximately one-third of global trade passes. Additional priorities include the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Israel-Hamas war, with its broader regional implications. While the divide between the Republican and Democratic stances on the Ukraine war may be irreconcilable, their differences concerning the Middle East, particularly regarding the Gaza conflict, are relatively minor. Both candidates are expected to prioritize U.S. strategic interests in the region while minimizing deep involvement in Middle Eastern affairs.

Five enduring principles guide U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The first is the unwavering commitment to Israel’s security and ensuring its military superiority in the region. This is evident in the advanced military technologies provided to Israel compared to the comparatively less sophisticated equipment supplied to other states. The second principle pertains to safeguarding the flow of oil through strategic waterways, notably the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, ensuring uninterrupted access to global markets. U.S. involvement in this area is designed to counter potential threats from Iran to disrupt navigation in the Persian Gulf or from Houthi forces to block the Red Sea.The third principle is the prevention of external powers, particularly Russia and China, from exerting dominance over Middle Eastern political affairs, a priority well understood by the region’s leadership. Fourth, the U.S. remains steadfast in its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The final guiding principle is the ongoing effort to combat terrorism, a key aspect of U.S. foreign policy.Despite these constants, the U.S. has recognized the complexities of Middle Eastern politics and the limitations of its influence. This understanding stems from the failures following the 2003 Iraq invasion, where heavy investments in democratization and reconstruction did not yield the intended outcomes. As a result, U.S. interest in the region has diminished over time, a trend that began with the Obama administration’s strategic “pivot to Asia.”

Moreover, the concerns of the American electorate, with the exception of Arab and Muslim Americans, remain largely disconnected from Middle Eastern issues. While the Gaza conflict may capture significant media and activist attention, it does not reflect the priorities of most U.S. voters, who are more concerned with domestic issues.If Donald Trump secures the presidency, his foreign policy is expected to emphasize the “America First” doctrine, characterized by a preference for signing trade agreements, a reluctance to engage in military interventions abroad, and a reduction of international commitments, including to NATO. In the Middle East, Trump has shown minimal interest in addressing the ongoing crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, focusing instead on domestic challenges. Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he has displayed little support for a two-state solution, preferring instead to pursue quick, often impractical solutions.A key focus of Trump’s Middle East policy will likely be normalizing relations between Israel and its neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. In 2020, Trump facilitated similar agreements between Israel and several Gulf states. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has expressed willingness to sign a peace treaty with Israel, even without a commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, the finalization of such a treaty may be delayed until after the U.S. election, as both bin Salman and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may prefer credit for the deal to go to Trump rather than to Kamala Harris. Trump might also consider formalizing a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia to encourage peace with Israel, though this would face significant challenges, including securing the support of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Once an agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is reached, Trump would likely pressure other Gulf states, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, to follow suit.

Regarding U.S.-Iran relations, Trump’s approach is expected to be more confrontational, relying on sanctions and economic pressure rather than military force. He has suggested the possibility of negotiating with Tehran, but only on terms favorable to the U.S. The election of a reformist president in Iran may open the door to such negotiations, although it remains unclear whether Iran can endure another four years of stringent U.S. sanctions. While Republicans and Democrats differ in their methods of addressing Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, the core U.S. position remains consistent. Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 set the tone for future relations, and although Joe Biden had promised to restore the agreement, negotiations during his presidency failed to produce results, leaving Trump-era sanctions in place.On the Democratic side, congressional candidates have generally supported Israel but have adopted a more nuanced stance, emphasizing human rights, the plight of Gaza’s civilians, and the need for a two-state solution. This contrasts with Republican candidates, who offer unconditional support to Israel, bolstered by the influence of right-wing Christian groups. The Democratic base, however, is divided, with younger, non-white voters expressing more sympathy for the Palestinian cause, while older white voters remain staunchly pro-Israel. Despite growing criticism of Israeli actions, particularly in Gaza, Democratic Party leaders have refrained from extreme positions due to the mainstream unpopularity of anti-Israel views.Kamala Harris, if elected, will likely adhere to core Democratic principles such as defending democratic values, promoting human rights, and strengthening alliances, especially with NATO. Her foreign policy will also focus on confronting global challenges such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and Russian aggression in Ukraine, as well as curbing Chinese influence in the Pacific. While she has largely avoided addressing Middle Eastern policy during her time as vice president, Harris may be compelled to engage more actively with the region’s complexities if she assumes the presidency. Although U.S. support for Israel is unlikely to change drastically, Harris has shown signs of diverging slightly from Biden, such as her call for a ceasefire in Gaza and her decision to boycott Netanyahu’s speech before Congress.

In terms of U.S.-Saudi relations, Harris has historically been critical of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and its involvement in the Yemen conflict. In 2020, she advocated for a reevaluation of U.S.-Saudi relations to ensure they align with American values and interests, though she did not specify what those values were. Nevertheless, her administration would likely continue efforts to strengthen security cooperation with Saudi Arabia and pursue collaboration on technological and green energy initiatives. Regarding Iran, Harris would likely adopt a balanced approach, seeking to renegotiate the nuclear deal, particularly in light of escalating tensions between Iran and Israel.The limitations of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are well understood within the region. Middle Eastern leaders recognize that while the U.S. is committed to combating terrorism and ensuring open sea lanes for trade, it is less inclined to involve itself in regional conflicts that do not directly affect American interests. For example, despite President Obama’s warning to Syrian President Bashar Assad not to use chemical weapons against his own people, the U.S. refrained from military intervention when Assad’s forces used sarin gas in 2012. Similarly, Trump’s decision not to retaliate after Houthi attacks on Saudi oil installations in 2019 signaled a limited U.S. commitment to defending Saudi interests when the impact on U.S. oil imports was minimal.The United Arab Emirates has also recognized these limitations, signaling that it does not intend to resume talks with the U.S. regarding the purchase of F-35 fighter jets, regardless of the outcome of the election. This reflects a broader understanding that primarily vital national interests, rather than a deeper commitment to regional stability or human rights drive U.S. engagement in the region. The region’s authoritarian leaders have thus been able to act with impunity, confident that U.S. involvement will remain limited as long as their actions do not conflict with American strategic interests.